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Contents:
  1. Part I: Philosophical and Linguistic Aspects
  2. 4 Replies to “Analytical Essay 2”
  3. John R. Searle, What is language : some preliminary remarks - PhilPapers
  4. Preliminary Remarks

I found myself struggling not only to communicate in a language that I have hitherto used only in a liturgical context, albeit for fifteen years, but also had to translate and coin, sometimes on the spot, computer terminology to get the lessons across. One finds speakers communicating in Kthobonoyo even when their linguistic backgrounds give rise to another common, sometimes native language. Attendees of Syriac Symposia are now hearing Kthobonoyo more often. I am happy to provide a personal example. I began speaking Kthobonoyo in with a low aptitude level. As I began reading Syriac on daily basis as part of my M.

After I moved back to the US in , I had little chance to speak Kthobonoyo and my aptitude level decreased until I decided to speak it at home with my children. The result is an intriguing peculiarity of a language that is morphologically gender sensitive. In male-female dialogues, the second person verbal paradigm is misused in both directions.

Males often address females in a mixture of masculine and feminine forms. This observation was made when a number of speakers, including myself, addressed my Kthobonoyo-speaking daughter Tabetha; e.

Part I: Philosophical and Linguistic Aspects

I have also observed adult females addressing males in a mixture of masculine and feminine forms; e. If and when the experience between the two speakers grows, less and less mistakes are made. It puts, for example, a limitation on the genres of dialogues that take place. While one may imagine gender related topics discussed, one is guaranteed that they are always given from a male perspective. Additionally, the social status of speakers puts a limitation to the range of topics which are usually under discussion.

Matters of church and community are common, but dialogues on the latest in pop culture are probably far fetched. Such dialogues take place between people who may have just been introduced, or between two speakers of two different social classes e. When a word is needed on the spot and the speaker cannot think of it, the speaker may go around by explaining it with a phrase to avoid code switching.

Mere formalities and niceties are well represented in Kthobonoyo that hardly any code switching is necessary.

What is Language?

Sometimes even niceties demand code switching. I am not aware of a Kthobonoyo term that expresses the full emotions of missing someone. When such a language is available, and especially in informal and serious discussion, it is easy to fall back to the second language in order to provide for technical terms.


  1. What is Language? Some Preliminary Remarks* John R. Searle!
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But when no such language exists, one has to find a way to express oneself without code switching. The primary challenge here is that much of the lexemes that are unique to Kthobonoyo are not systematically recorded e. On the one hand, the Kthobonoyo lexicon employs many new additions, and gives some of the existing words a new meaning. On the other hand, the Kthobonoyo lexicon employs only a subset of the larger literary lexicon.

4 Replies to “Analytical Essay 2”

Much of Kthobonoyo vocabulary can be found in recent dictionaries, though always mixed with Modern and Classical Literary Syriac. Sometimes a term is coined on the spot. Possessive and object suffixes of complex verbs are avoided e. Active participle forms are used primarily as present tense verbs and hardly as nouns.

The infinitive is quite infrequent, especially with an object e. When Sebastian P. In Kthobonoyo, the verb is hardly at the end of a phrase or sentence, while in Classical Syriac one case place the verb in various positions of the sentence. We have seen that Kthobonoyo is a continuation of the tradition of speaking classical Syriac from earlier centuries, but was encouraged in our period due to necessity and national identity.

Kthobonoyo has its own linguistic and sociolinguistic features such as male centricity, the strong use of code switching, and the lexical idiosyncrasies. A more thorough investigation of the topic, especially around syntax and usage, would ideally require a recorded corpus. Asad, Gabriel. Ashitha, Odisho. Hilqa de Leshana Assyrian-Arabic Dictionary Atto, Simon. It has been proven, that children do not have the ability to produce or understand sarcasm.

One study, by Glenwright and Pexman found that it is not until about six years of age that children begin to identify when sarcasm and irony are being used in conversation, and even when they can identify its use, children are not able to comprehend what the speaker is meaning to say, until about ten years of age Glenwright and Pexman 1. This is significant to my argument because at the basis of sarcasm is linguistic representation of meaning. For example, one night at a dinner table a parent is explaining to their child that they have a lot of work to complete.

John R. Searle, What is language : some preliminary remarks - PhilPapers

Then they leave the table and five minutes later the child runs up to the parent and asks them to play a game. This example shows that children cannot separate the physical words an adult is says, with the actual meaning that the adult is trying to get across, and therefore children do not understand linguistic representation of meaning, which is the underlying foundation for sarcasm. I confirmed this by first explaining that Searle believes both consciousness and intentionality are necessary in order to have prelinguistic language, and that babies indeed do possess both of these qualities.

Then I described how a fundamental aspect of language to Searle is comprehending linguistic representation of meaning, and explaining that it is evident children do not have this ability because they do not have sarcasm, and sarcasm is rooted in the linguistic representation of meaning. Glenwright, Melanie, and Penny M. Sarcasm and Verbal Irony. John R. I like the way you structured your essay, it is very easy to follow. With that said, would you say that autistic children do not have language because in some cases, people on the spectrum can not understand sarcasm?

Your title definitely piqued my interest and after reading your thesis I was very curious to see your evidence for the sarcasm argument. I would have never thought of the ability to use or understand sarcasm to be an indication of linguistic language. I thought the structure of your essay was logical and your arguments were well articulated, but I was left with the same question as Vy.


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  • The first great philosophical system to develop from Upaniadic and epic speculation was given the name Skhya, meaning connected with enumeration, listing. It is in fact in philosophical texts, starting precisely from those of the Skhya school, that we should look for a thesaurus of human passions and emotions, analysed and classified with obstinate accuracy and an absolutely neutral and scientific grasp, as in the classical texts of Vaieika, or else with a mixture of coldness and preoccupation, as often occurs in Buddhist and Jaina texts that describe them, keeping their gaze fixed on the meditating devotee who might be threatened by them.

    But the researcher into Indian passions and emotions will soon discover with equal surprise that he must delve into treatises on aesthetics and rhetoric perhaps even more than into philosophical and religious texts. If, now satiated by descriptions - albeit sometimes of great precision - the researcher of passions wishes to discover how they are assessed in the Indian world, things become even more complicated.

    They are differently assessed according to the subjects social position, his belonging to one or another of the four basic states of life rama , and according to caste. While anger and disdain manyu , as Minoru Hara has demonstrated in one of his seminal lexical analyses, are generally reprehensible in the man of the street, they are even obligatory for those belonging to the katriya class of sovereigns and warriors Hara In examining the philosophical-religious texts of Hinduism on such themes, we must first be aware that by far the greater part of them comes from the Brahmanic lite, which thus seeks to envelop the entire Indian reality in its coils.

    Our first impression after observing the central stream of Brahmanic thought is of a considerable integration mostly absent in the West1 - of the individuals physical, psychic-emotive and intellectual dimensions. A single nature runs through them uninterruptedly: it passes fluidly from one level to another, gradually including the animal and vegetal worlds.

    In the words of Louis Dumont 30, quoted in Bouillier-Tarabout Introduction, 18 : Il n'y a pas de coupure entre l'homme et la nature. La chose est sensible dans le vtement - le corps s'enroule dans une pice d'toffe -, dans la simplicit de vie matrielle et la forme des objets d'usage courant. En musique, l'heure de la journe prescrit le ton sentimental de la mlodie: impossible d'tre nostalgique le matin et gai le soir There is no hiatus between man and nature. This is appreciable in clothing the body wraps itself in a piece of cloth or in the simplicity of material life and the form of objects we use every day.

    In music, the time of day prescribes the sentimental mode of the melody: impossible to be nostalgic in the morning and gay in the evening Albeit deeply rooted in common opinion, such a view is however substantially a blunder: far from being absent, dualism is merely radicalised to the extreme. In Skhya for example and Skhya with its cosmogenesis remains the model for much of later Brahmanic speculation cf. Torella an apparently unbridgeable abyss separates the world of nature prakti comprising the body, senses, passions and mental functions forming an integrated whole from the world of the spirit, alone responsible for striking the spark of consciousness, without which the continual gross activity of the sensorial faculties, of the inner sense, of the I-notion and the intellect could never finally 1.

    Among the most conspicuous exceptions is Aristotle. An integrated monism of body, senses, emotions and intellectual faculties consequently does exist but leaves out that very principle that alone can give meaning to the whole. The goal is not the final achieving of greater unity, but the recognition of an irremediable otherness, having reached which, the psyche-body-nature complex progressively withdraws from the scene, like a dancer, recounts a famous stanza of the Skhya-krik v.

    The material, emotional and psychic universe thus comes into existence solely so that the soul can recognise itself as being foreign to it and isolate itself in its own self-identity. Even this recognition is made possible by the action of prakti itself, which thus finds in its own negation its ultimate reason for existence. Based on such a premise, two alternatives are possible: to accentuate the integrated and unitary aspect of the body-sensespsyche-intellect complex, or to concentrate on the otherness of the knower principle, the spirit.

    Brahmanic philosophy and, mutatis mutandis, Jaina and even Buddhist philosophy, despite a programmatic rejection of any substantiality of the subject decidedly take the second alternative, the option that we might, somewhat roughly, term ascetic. The whole fermenting energy potential of human drives, including the intellectual, which the West would on the other hand place on the other side, is seen as troublesome ballast from which man must free himself.

    Solely over the desert of body and passions can the moon of the spirit rise. An incurable ontological weakness undermines the roots of whatever is tinted with pleasure or sorrow, or arouses desire or aversion. The whole human adventure may thus take on a fainter outline or sometimes a more sombre one, as in the scenario depicted by the Vedntin Surevara in its sub-commentary on the Taittirya-Upaniad, which explores mans wretchedness right from his mothers uterus, a place of ineffable delights for the West.

    Several times in past existences I have fallen into the scorching sands of hell that burn wicked souls, but these drops of bile superheated by the fires of digestion make my tender body suffer much more. Stomach worms with mouths as sharp as thorns torture me, already tortured enough by the bones of my mothers body that cut into me on all sides. The miseries of the hell of Kumbhipka are nothing compared to the tortures I experience in the uterus, full of the most disgusting miasmas that burn owing to the stomachs digestive fire. Deprived of all control as though a demon possessed him, driven by the karma of the creature yet unborn, [the father to be] plunges rapidly into the womans fire, like a moth avid for the flame.

    Taittiryopaniadbhyavrttikam, Brahmavall, prathama khaa, vv. In a manner no less atrocious than life in the uterus is presented the moment of birth and infancy and youth as they come along tormented by sexual desire, blinded alternately by one passion or other, by love and anger -, up to the rabid impotence of old age. The epilogue that follows is not exactly an apotheosis: h knte h dhane putra krandamna sudruam maka iva sarpea gryate mtyun nara [] virmavkasada khalu jvaloka sya sya vsavka samet prata pratas tena tena praynti tyaktvnyonya ta ca vka vihag yadvat tadvaj jtayo jtaya ca mtibja bhavej janma janmabja tath mti ghaiyantravad arnto bambhramty ania nara While weeping bitterly over his beloved, his wealth and the son he has to leave, the man is swallowed up by death, like a toad by a serpent.

    One evening birds perch on it in search of a haven for the night and next morning leave it and fly away each wherever he will. Similarly, men encounter, for a brief time, friends or strangers in this world and then disperse. Birth leads to death and death to birth: thus, men ceaselessly circle forever, like the wheel the draws water from the well.

    Preliminary Remarks

    In any final analysis, it is from its grip that man must free himself to rise toward the tman or nirva. Even a text certainly not focused on asceticism, like the Bhagavadgt, does not fail to launch a lengthy, venomous attack against desire: arjuna uvca: atha kena prayukto 'ya ppa carati prua 1. By what is he driven almost by force, O Ka? The Blessed One replied: It is desire kma that drives him, it is anger, arising from the rajas1 component. This is the great devourer, the great Evil One.